I'm a philosopher at the University of Maryland, College Park. I work on modal language, causal reasoning, expressivism, intentionality, variables, future-oriented talk, scalar implicature, and a few more things.
Abstract: I defend a plasible bridge principle that replaces Skyrms' Thesis: the probability of "If A, would C" equals the probability of C, in the counterfactual scenario that we reach by supposing A.
Abstract: We give a semantics for confidence reports that is based on states, and that generalizes to both nouns ("confidence") and adjectives ("confident").
OLDER DRAFTS
These drafts have either been superseded by published work, or are on a long-term backburner. They are here because they have been cited. Comments are welcome anyway!
Abstract: Classical consequence is the logic of credence, informational consequence the logic of acceptance. It's harder than you think to vindicate this intuitive idea.
Superseded by "Trivializing Informational Consequence" (go to paper)